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ANALYSIS
2017 Year in Review: Russian Domestic Politics
Vladimir Gel’man, European University at St. Petersburg / University of Helsinki
Abstract:
2017 was a year of tactical successes for Russia’s authoritarian regime. On the domestic front, it remains 
unchallenged, despite continuing economic problems, growing protests and increasing disappointments 
among elites and masses. Although the Kremlin has effectively averted risks prior to the upcoming March 
2018 presidential elections, the major challenges lie ahead.
On the Eve of Presidential Elections
According to the calendar of events in Russian domes-
tic politics, the year of 2017 was an interlude between 
State Duma elections (conducted in September 2016 
and resulted in a  landslide victory of United Russia) 
and presidential elections, scheduled for March 2018. 
Aiming to further strengthen the power of Vladimir 
Putin and to avoid any post-election protests that might 
even slightly resemble those of 2011–2012, the Kremlin 
concentrated on the upcoming presidential campaign 
as the major task of all state-driven political machinery. 
At first sight, this should not be a risky game. Given the 
high popular approval rates of Putin, the seeming lack 
of viable alternatives to the political status quo in light 
of the notorious weakness of the opposition in Russia, 
and the successful implementation of a policy of low-
scale repression as a tool of the regime’s preemptive con-
trol over dissent, the Kremlin should easily maintain its 
dominance over Russia’s political landscape. Neverthe-
less, the regime feels itself to be vulnerable and these 
feelings increased in 2017, against the background of 
sluggish economic recovery and increasing disappoint-
ments among both elites and masses.
Within the context of a presidential campaign, the 
Kremlin found itself between a rock and a hard place. 
On the one hand, it is faced with increasing political 
demobilization given the non-competitive nature of elec-
tions—the voter turnout during the 2016 State Duma 
elections was 48 per cent, the lowest-ever in post-Soviet 
history (and in the large Russia’s cities, it was even lower). 
Presidential elections should not be a boring ritual sim-
ilar to Soviet-style elections without choice and intended 
to bring as many voters as possible to the polling stations 
so that Putin can claim a renewed legitimacy. On the 
other hand, the amount of carrots available for buying 
the loyalty of Russian voters is much lower than dur-
ing previous elections, and the regime has been forced 
to rely upon the extensive use of sticks towards its rivals.
The scope of the repressions in 2017 was not so harsh, 
in terms of the numbers of political prisoners or vic-
tims of political violence, but were highly sensitive for 
all real and/or potential challengers of the Kremlin. In 
September 2017, a major star of the Russian theater, the 
nonconformist Moscow stage director Kirill Serebrenni-
kov was put on criminal trial, due to accusations of mis-
appropriating state funds. The former technocratic min-
ister of economic development, Alexey Ulyukaev was 
sentenced to eight years in jail in December, because of 
criminal charges of bribery relating to the privatization 
of large block of shares of the state oil company Ros-
neft. The renowned European University in St. Peter-
sburg, a private graduate school in social science and 
humanities, lost its educational license during 2017 and 
has been evicted from its premises in the city center of 
St. Petersburg. Experts argued that all of these cases 
were manufactured by the law enforcement agencies, 
as well as by interest groups (in Ulyukaev’s case, by 
Rosneft top management), in order to produce demon-
strative effects as part of a state-induced politics of fear. 
Western-minded intellectuals, being afraid of a further 
“tightening of the screws”, opted for emigration or at 
least lowering the tone of their critical voices, and have 
avoided joining the camp of protesters. At the same 
time, independent media faced further shrinking of 
freedom of speech. RBK holdings, previously controlled 
by the former presidential candidate Mikhail Prokho-
rov, changed its owner and editorial line. The popu-
lar Echo Moskvy radio station faced financial troubles, 
and one of its leading journalists, Tatyana Felgenhauer, 
was attacked by a  stranger with a knife while in the 
office. Attempts to increase state control over the Inter-
net and social media continued throughout the whole 
year. Also in 2017, there was a continuation of vicious 
violent attacks by pro-Kremlin militants at “unwanted” 
cultural events and entities, as well as against political 
activists (such as Alexey Navalny), without serious pros-
ecution by the Russian authorities.
Apart from countering real or potential dissent, the 
Kremlin invested new efforts into the strengthening of 
the “power vertical”, the hierarchy used to govern not 
only the economy, but also political processes across 
Russia’s regions and cities. In 2017, more than twenty 
regional chief executives (including some long-standing 
holders of these jobs) left their posts and were replaced 
by younger officials, often without major political expe-
rience. In most instances, the delivery of votes in elec-
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tions is considered as the main task for new appoint-
ees. Meanwhile, the centralization of the state control, 
launched in the early 2000s, reached the last bastion 
of regional autonomy, Tatarstan. In 2017, the Kremlin 
refused to prolong the bilateral treaty on the division 
of power between Moscow and Kazan (first signed in 
1994, and then confirmed twice after that, it was the 
only legal act of this kind, which remained in force until 
2017). Later in the year, the mandatory titular language 
classes in schools in all ethnic republics of Russia were 
officially cancelled at Putin’s request, thus causing major 
disappointments in Tatarstan. The efforts of the repub-
lican leadership to protect the special status of Tatar-
stan (let alone the status of all other republics, except for 
Chechnya) proved to be in vain. However, despite this 
growing disappointment among elites and the contin-
uing struggles between rent-seeking actors, there is no 
sign of open or latent disloyalty among Russia’s ruling 
class on the eve of the presidential elections.
Protests Rising
Economic problems continued in 2017, despite the rise 
in the global oil price up to $60+ per barrel (to some 
extent fueled by the deal between Russia and OPEC) 
and the major efforts of the Central Bank of Russia to 
target inflation (about 3 per cent in 2017, the lowest 
ever index in post-Soviet history). The optimistic signs 
of economic growth in early 2017 had become skeptical 
accounts by the end of the year, especially given the new 
wave of decline in the real incomes of Russians, expecta-
tions of a further deepening of international economic 
sanctions and the uncertain prospects for the future. 
As a result, 2017 saw an increase in economic and labor 
protests across Russia’s regions. Most of these actions 
remained local and/or issue-based by nature and have 
not challenged the regime, as such being more or less 
minor nuisances for the Kremlin. Even social protests 
in major cities (such as meetings against the housing 
renovation program in Moscow or against the takeover 
of St. Isaac’s cathedral in St. Petersburg by the Russian 
Orthodox Church) mostly had local, rather than nation-
wide significance and did not affect Russia’s political 
landscape much.
However, the political movement, formed around 
opposition leader Navalny, became a  major trouble-
maker for Russia’s authorities in 2017. Early in the year, 
Navalny announced his intention to run in the 2018 
presidential elections, and launched a major campaign 
tour across Russia’s regions, accompanied by mass meet-
ings and public gatherings. His team opened campaign 
headquarters in 80+ major cities, and effectively used 
Youtube videos and other Web resources as means of 
communication and mobilization. In March 2017, Nav-
alny posted online the documentary video, On vam 
ne Dimon, which openly accused the prime minister 
Dmitry Medvedev of various instances of corruption. 
The video, watched by 20+ million viewers, was met 
with no official responses from the Kremlin and/or law 
enforcement agencies. Navalny, in turn, called for pro-
test actions, which were held on 26 March and 12 June 
2017 in a number of Russian cities. Surprisingly for many 
observers, these actions brought to the streets many 
young people, attracted by Navalny’s claims and political 
style. Some observers even considered these tendencies as 
early signs of a “revolutionary situation”, in light of the 
centennial jubilee of the 1917 Russian revolution, but 
in fact they have not reached the level of a major anti-
system mobilization. Meanwhile, the Kremlin effec-
tively blocked Navalny’s participation in the presiden-
tial elections. In spite of his low public approval rate, the 
very possibility of real electoral competition was con-
sidered by Kremlin’s strategists as an existential threat 
to Russia’s political regime. Although public gatherings 
in twenty Russian cities officially nominated Navalny’s 
candidacy, the Central Electoral Commission banned 
him from balloting, because of a law prohibiting Russian 
citizens with a criminal record of serious offences from 
running in elections. In 2013, Navalny was charged with 
a criminal offence and got probation instead of incar-
ceration, but, in 2016, his legal case was overturned by 
the European Court of Human Rights. Deprived from 
running in elections, Navalny called for an “active boy-
cott” of the elections and protest actions on the eve of 
elections, thus turning his temporary campaign network 
into a regular opposition political movement.
The call for a boycott coincided with an increase in 
expectations about the predictable outcome of the elec-
tions: according to a Levada Center survey, conducted 
in December 2017, 75 per cent of those Russian voters, 
who intended to participate in March 2018 elections, 
preferred to vote for Putin (the next potential candidate, 
Vladimir Zhirinovsky, was endorsed by 10 per cent of 
voters). It contributed to warnings regarding low voter 
turnout (the same survey demonstrated that only 30 per 
cent of respondents “definitely” intended to vote, and 
another 28 per cent declared that they were “likely” to 
go to polls). The Kremlin needed new figures on the bal-
lot, who may attract the interest of voters. This is why 
the Communist Party of Russia replaced its 73-year-
old leader Gennady Zyuganov with the previously little 
known 57-year-old agricultural businessman, Pavel Gru-
dinin (formerly a regional lawmaker from United Rus-
sia) as its candidate. At the flank of the so-called “sys-
temic liberals”, apart from long-standing Yabloko leader 
Grigory Yavlinsky, 36-year-old TV star Xenia Sobchak, 
the daughter of Putin’s former boss Anatoly Sobchak 
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(city mayor of St. Petersburg in 1991–1996), declared 
her candidacy under the label of “against all” existing 
candidates, with a conspicuously pro-democratic and 
pro-Western political program. However, many analysts 
predict that the increase in voter turnout in March 2018 
may be achieved largely through the widespread use of 
workplace mobilization to ensure employees turn up to 
vote, especially in the public sector, as well as by mass 
practices of electoral fraud. To what extent the Krem-
lin will be able to avoid post-election protests remains 
to be seen.
Challenges Lies Ahead?
As for Putin, in 2017, he did not launch any major new 
initiatives in domestic politics, and his policy promises 
before the presidential campaign remain intentionally 
vague. The only exception was the introduction of state 
payments for low-income families with newborn chil-
dren from 2018 (accompanied with the prolongation 
of the maternity capital program until 2021). How-
ever, the contours of the economic policies under the 
new government (as well as the composition of the gov-
ernment after the 2018 elections) are still uncertain. In 
2017, two major teams of experts proposed policy pro-
grams for Putin, based on hardly compatible agendas. 
The Center for Strategic Research, led by the former 
minister of finance Alexei Kudrin, proposed structural 
reforms, alongside major institutional changes aimed at 
economic (and, to a lesser degree, political) liberaliza-
tion and overcoming the international isolation of Russia. 
Alternatively, the isolationist and statist Stolypin Club, 
grouped around Boris Titov and Sergey Glazyev, sug-
gested a major increase of state investments into high-
tech industries and the stimulation of domestic con-
sumer demand as would-be drivers of economic growth. 
However, Putin has not disclosed his actual policy pref-
erences and it is unlikely that he will initiate major pol-
icy changes after his expected reelection in 2018.
Overall, in 2017, Russia did not experience any key 
changes in domestic politics. The Kremlin kept its firm 
control over political processes and did not encounter 
irresolvable problems in the short term, at least, before 
the March 2018 presidential elections. The inertia 
created by two previous choices made by the Russian 
leadership—in 2012, when the regime’s partial liberal-
ization was shifted to a repressive politics of fear, and 
in 2014, when Russia sacrificed the policy of prioritiz-
ing economic growth and development for the sake 
of geopolitical adventures—continue to determine the 
conduct of domestic politics and are likely to cast their 
shadows for a longer period of time. This does not mean 
that the regime will avoid major challenges to its dom-
inance in the long term—sluggish economic growth, 
generational changes, and international sanctions may 
contribute to political changes, but not immediately. 
As of yet, the desire of Russian leaders to preserve the 
political status quo and consolidate their power under 
authoritarianism has met few obstacles.
About the Author:
Vladimir Gel’man is professor at the European University at St. Petersburg and at the Aleksanteri Institute, Univer-
sity of Helsinki.
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Stagnation and Change in the Russian Economy
Richard Connolly, University of Birmingham and Chatham House
Abstract
The Russian economy returned to growth in 2017 after a prolonged recession. However, the pace of recov-
ery unexpectedly subsided in the second half of the year despite favourable external conditions. As a result, 
many observers now fear that the Russian economy is stagnant and that only structural reform will reignite 
growth to levels approximating or in excess of the global average rate of growth. Nevertheless, several areas 
of the Russian economy are performing extremely well, suggesting that the characterisation of a stagnant 
economy may be too simplistic and missing some important areas of change.
ANALYSIS
After a protracted recession that began in early 2015, the Russian economy returned to growth in 2017. 
However, the estimated rate of GDP growth—1.5 per 
cent—was lower than many had hoped for earlier in 
2017, when some of the more optimistic forecasts, such as 
those produced by Russia’s Ministry of Economic Devel-
opment, suggested that the economy might expand by 
as much as 2 per cent. Despite oil prices hitting their 
highest level since 2014, official forecasts—both from 
within Russia and from international agencies—suggest 
that growth will continue at its current anaemic pace 
into 2018. This poorer-than-expected performance has 
led many observers to suggest that the Russian econ-
omy is essentially stagnant, and that the prospects for 
economic growth will remain bleak until the leader-
ship engages in significant structural economic reform. 
While this is an obvious conclusion to draw when exam-
ining aggregate data, closer inspection of the economic 
data reveals that considerable change is taking place 
across the Russian economy, with a number of impor-
tant sectors growing at a brisk pace.
Macro-Level Stagnation…
The Russian economy recorded annual GDP growth in 
2017 for the first time in three years. The most recent 
Rosstat estimate, released at the beginning of February, 
indicates that GDP expanded by 1.5 per cent. This was 
towards the lower end of the range of most official fore-
casts made at the beginning of the year, when annual 
growth of between 1.5–2 per cent was forecast. In the 
summer, it had looked as though growth would surpass 
expectations after the economy recorded brisk growth in 
the first half of the year. However, the rate of year-on-year 
growth slowed considerably towards the end of the year, 
dampening any sense of optimism that the economy 
might quickly return to a pre-recession level of output.
This slowdown at the end of the year was all the more 
disappointing, because it took place against a backdrop 
of improving external conditions.
First, the deal between Russia and OPEC to reduce 
crude oil output, concluded at the end of 2016, began to 
achieve its intended objective of reducing global crude 
inventories, which in turn exerted upward pressure on 
spot prices for crude oil across the world. In 2016, the 
average price for Urals crude was $42.1 per barrel; in 
2017, this rose by 21 per cent to $53.3 per barrel. In the 
past, an annual increase in the price of Russia’s primary 
export product would have generated faster GDP growth.
Second, the wider global economic growth picture 
improved as the year progressed. According to the IMF, 
global growth was expected to accelerate by 0.4 per-
centage points in 2017, reaching 3.6 per cent. This was 
expected to rise to 3.7 per cent in 2018. The strong global 
growth performance saw Russia’s main trading part-
ners—the Eurozone economies and China—grow at an 
estimated rate of 2.4 per cent and 6.8 per cent respec-
tively. In both cases, performance exceeded most fore-
casts made at the beginning of the year. Ordinarily, an 
improvement in the fortunes of Russia’s main trading 
partners would result in faster growth in Russia, not the 
slowdown observed at the end of the year.
Third, Russia’s economic performance in 2017 was 
much weaker than the populous middle-income coun-
tries located near Russia, such as Poland (estimated GDP 
growth of 4.1 per cent in 2017) and Turkey (5.1 per cent), 
and was also weaker than neighboring natural resource-
exporting economies like Kazakhstan (3.5 per cent) and 
Turkmenistan (5.7 per cent).
Thus, although Russia avoided the economic apoc-
alypse that some observers had predicted would ensue 
when Russia was hit by a combination of Western sanc-
tions and declining oil prices in 2014, and is now on a 
path of slow but steady recovery, it is also clear that some-
thing is holding back aggregate economic performance, 
even as external conditions have improved.
Identifying the sources of Russia’s seemingly anemic 
economic performance demands detailed examination 
of economic data, not least because headline figures can 
often conceal important developments at more fine-
grained levels of analysis.
Looking at the main indicators, the obvious culprit 
for the deteriorating performance in the second half of 
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the year was industrial production, and, more specifi-
cally, manufacturing. Annual growth in industrial pro-
duction amounted to a mere 1 per cent, which was espe-
cially poor considering that this was a slightly slower rate 
than that recorded in 2016—a year in which the econ-
omy contracted on aggregate—when industrial produc-
tion grew at 1.1 per cent.
There are two immediate explanations for the decline 
in industrial production in the second half of the year. 
First, oil extraction—which constitutes a major com-
ponent of industrial production—did not grow in 2017, 
due to Russia’s commitment to reducing output as part 
of the deal with OPEC. This also dragged output down 
in other areas of the economy that are highly correlated 
with oil extraction, especially oil extraction equipment. 
Second, unseasonably mild weather in the winter damp-
ened demand for fuel and heating across the country.
Furthermore, there was considerable variation in per-
formance across different branches of industry. Strong 
performance in gas extraction (annual growth of over 
8 per cent), as well as in other mining branches (coal pro-
duction, for example, rose by over 6 per cent), meant that 
output in extractive industries expanded by around 2 per 
cent. However, manufacturing barely grew at all (0.4 per 
cent). Consequently, despite a high-profile import sub-
stitution campaign and elevated spending on the pro-
curement of armaments, the volume of manufacturing 
production remained well below pre-recession levels.
Other headline figures for 2017 also dampened opti-
mism that the recovery from recession would be robust. 
Investment in fixed capital grew by 3.5 per cent over 
the course of 2017, causing the fixed investment share 
of GDP to rise slightly from 21.6 per cent in 2016 to 
21.8 per cent. Given that most economists would agree 
that Russia needs to be investing around 25–30 per 
cent of GDP annually for a sustained period of time to 
achieve anything approximating modernization, the 
modest growth in investment is clearly insufficient. 
Indeed, the pace of this recovery in investment is slower 
than might be expected, not least because the protracted 
length of the slump in investment that took place over 
2014–2016 would suggest that significant latent demand 
for investment exists. Furthermore, mirroring the tra-
jectory of industrial production, the pace of investment 
growth slowed at the end of 2017 as investment by the 
state and large firms declined. It is possible that invest-
ors might be waiting for signs that the recovery is well 
and truly underway before committing themselves to 
long-term investment projects. But there are also legit-
imate fears that investment is not being held back by a 
lack of ‘animal spirits’, but instead by structural con-
straints, such as weak property rights and poor access to 
capital for small and medium-sized enterprises.
On the positive side, living standards continued to 
improve, albeit in an uneven and fitful fashion. Infla-
tion dropped to a post-Soviet low level of 2.5 per cent, 
retail sales registered modest growth of 1 per cent, and 
the recorded unemployment rate remained at a post-
Soviet low of close to 5 per cent. Household consump-
tion grew by 3.4 per cent. The state of federal govern-
ment finances also turned out better than had initially 
been expected, with a federal budget deficit of no more 
than 2 per cent of GDP expected for 2017, considera-
bly lower than the deficit of 2.5 per cent forecast by the 
Ministry of Finance earlier in the year. This improve-
ment in fortunes was driven primarily by the increase 
in tax revenues derived from oil extraction and exports, 
the value of which exceeded official forecasts made ear-
lier in the year.
Overall, then, it would appear quite justified to 
describe the Russian economy as ‘stagnant’. Consump-
tion and investment grew, but at a much slower rate than 
might be expected after a protracted recession, and cer-
tainly at a slower rate than would usually take place when 
oil prices rose by over 20 per cent. And although fed-
eral government finances are in better shape than some 
had feared, the fact that the government is conducting 
a relatively contractionary fiscal policy has done little 
to help trigger an improvement in business confidence.
In short, the macro figures presented here suggest 
that the Russian economy is limping out of recession 
and remains vulnerable to any turbulence on global oil 
markets that might threaten the few green shoots of 
recovery observed to date.
…Concealing Micro-Level Change
However, while this picture roughly corresponds with 
the conventional narrative on the prospects for the Rus-
sian economy—that it is stagnant and vulnerable to 
reversal—the reality is more complicated.
For instance, while it might be tempting to con-
clude that Russian manufacturing in particular is in 
the doldrums, despite the best efforts of the govern-
ment to support it, closer inspection reveals that cer-
tain pockets of manufacturing are booming. Output in 
the pharmaceutical and automobile industries—areas 
where the government has focused particular attention 
in recent years—both grew by over 12 per cent. Out-
put in rubber and plastic products grew by over 10 per 
cent, after registering over 5 per cent growth in the pre-
vious year. Output in the chemicals industry grew by 
over 4 per cent, continuing a trend of consecutive annual 
growth that stretches back to 2010. A similar trend is 
evident in food processing, which has grown every year 
since 1998. Outside manufacturing, other service sec-
tors of the economy also performed well. Transportation 
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and storage services, for instance, grew by 3.7 per cent, 
while information and communication services grew at 
a rate of 3.6 per cent.
Much has been made in recent years by the lead-
ership of Russia’s progress in the agricultural sector. 
Growth in output that defied the wider downturn in 
economic performance over 2015–16 continued, albeit 
at a slightly slower rate than in 2016. Overall agricul-
tural output grew by 2.4 per cent, a slower rise than the 
4.7 per cent growth recorded in 2016. Although this 
meant that the pace of growth across most categories of 
agricultural production slowed, the grain harvest deliv-
ered a post-Soviet record of 130 million tons.
To be sure, strong performance in these areas has 
not proven sufficient to generate more robust aggregate 
performance. However, the fact that certain segments 
of the economy are booming indicates that the simple 
story of stagnation may be misleading. What may be 
closer to the truth is that this is an economy undergo-
ing a slow and for some industries—such as metallurgy 
and tobacco production—painful process of restructur-
ing. The sectors that are performing better than average 
tend to be located in either the higher value-added seg-
ments of manufacturing or in the services sector. These 
are areas where continued growth might, if sustained, 
help generate a more sophisticated and diversified eco-
nomic structure.
Prospects for the Year Ahead
As usual, developments on the global oil market will 
shape the outlook for the Russian economy. While 
global inventories of oil have fallen, they remain high 
by historic standards, prompting the extension of the 
Russia–OPEC deal to the end of 2018. Forecasters 
are divided on what is likely to happen in the coming 
months. Recent forecasts from the International Energy 
Agency (IEA) suggest that inventory levels may rise in 
the coming months, despite the output cut. If so, oil 
prices are unlikely to rise significantly, and could even 
fall. By contrast, more bullish forecasters, such as Gold-
man Sachs, are predicting that prices will continue to rise 
over the course of the year. Indeed, if inventories con-
tinue to fall, a closer gap between supply and demand 
could result in any geopolitical shocks—unrest in Iran 
or Venezuela, for example, or conflict on the Korean pen-
insula—generating disproportionately strong upward 
pressure on prices.
Domestically, some observers are hopeful that a com-
fortable win for Vladimir Putin in the presidential elec-
tion in March will presage a significant change in econ-
omic policy. Given the revealed preference for a mix of 
conservative macroeconomic policies and incremental, 
technocratic institutional changes (e.g. making progress 
in the World Bank Doing Business Index), it remains 
unlikely that any significant structural reforms will be 
announced. This will not stop those close to the lead-
ership generating plans to boost the rate of annual eco-
nomic growth to over 3 per cent. However, while some 
progress in macroeconomic reform might be expected—
for instance, the Finance Minister, Anton Siluanov, has 
hinted at plans to reform the taxation system and to 
reorient federal government spending towards health, 
education and infrastructure—meaningful progress in 
implementing micro-level and structural reforms—i.e. 
improving property rights, strengthening the rule of 
law, and so on—is less likely. Strong entrenched interest 
groups close to the leadership, as well as the economic 
requirements of meeting the leadership’s foreign and 
security policy objectives, are all likely to constrain any 
reformist impulses. Indeed, in January, it was rumoured 
that the president informed high-profile executives that 
they should not expect any significant change in the 
business environment in the near future.
Instead, any economic stimulus from the authorities 
is likely to come either from targeted injections of fed-
eral government spending on socially- and politically-
important constituencies as part of the presidential elec-
tion campaign, or from the Central Bank. Assuming 
no sharp fluctuations in the oil price, the current and 
historically low rate of inflation should give the Cen-
tral Bank room to continue reducing interest rates from 
the current level of 7.75 per cent (compared to 10.5 per 
cent a year ago).
Western sanctions—especially the prospect of tighter 
US sanctions—will remain an important factor, if for no 
other reason than that sanctions, and even simply the 
threat of them, do tend to force the Russian authorities 
to undertake new economic policies. The import substi-
tution campaign, as well as vigorous efforts to cultivate 
closer economic ties with non-Western countries, both 
emerged in response to sanctions. According to Anton 
Siluanov, the authorities must make greater efforts to 
improve the business environment to make Russia a 
more enticing destination for investment, for both for-
eign and domestic investors. This would, he argued, 
reduce the impact of any additional sanctions imposed 
by the US in the near future. As a result, the author-
ities are planning another capital amnesty to attract the 
repatriation of capital held by Russian citizens offshore. 
Measures to use state-owned banks to execute defence 
order transactions, as well as to reduce the transpar-
ency of state-owned enterprises, were also put in place 
in response to sanctions. It is likely that any future sanc-
tions will impel the Russian authorities to craft new 
responses that may have a significant impact on the 
business environment.
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Conclusion
To sum up: Russia’s economy looks set to continue a 
slow and uneven recovery from a protracted and pain-
ful recession. While a sudden fall in oil prices could set 
this recovery back, the relatively conservative macroeco-
nomic policies set by the Ministry of Finance and the 
Central Bank mean that the authorities should be well 
placed to respond to any deterioration in the economic 
outlook. Furthermore, although the aggregate picture 
remains underwhelming, especially by the standards 
of Russia’s previous post-recession recoveries, the fact 
that a number of sectors are recording robust growth in 
output indicates that the economy is far from stagnant.
About the Author
Richard Connolly is director of the Centre for Russian, European and Eurasian Studies at the University of Birming-
ham. He is also associate fellow on the Russia and Eurasia programme at Chatham House and visiting professor at 
the Russian Academy of the National Economy in Moscow. He is the author of a forthcoming book to be published 
by Cambridge University Press on how sanctions have affected the Russian economy.
Figure 1: Real GDP Growth of Russia and Selected Regions and Coutries (2007 – 2022, Annual 
Per Cent Change)
Values for 2017: estimate; values for 2018 – 2022: forecast
Source: International Monetary Fund Data Mapper, <http://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/NGDP_RPCH@WEO/OEMDC/
ADVEC/WEOWORLD>, accessed 6 February 2018
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022
Russian Federation 8,5 5,2 -7,8 4,5 5,1 3,7 1,8 0,7 -2,8 -0,2 1,8 1,6 1,5 1,5 1,5 1,5
China, People's Republic of 14,2 9,6 9,2 10,6 9,5 7,9 7,8 7,3 6,9 6,7 6,8 6,5 6,3 6,2 6 5,8
Euro area 3 0,4 -4,5 2,1 1,6 -0,9 -0,2 1,3 2 1,8 2,1 1,9 1,7 1,6 1,5 1,5
Poland 7,2 3,9 2,6 3,7 5 1,6 1,4 3,3 3,9 2,6 3,8 3,3 3 2,8 2,7 2,6
Turkey 5 0,8 -4,7 8,5 11,1 4,8 8,5 5,2 6,1 3,2 5,1 3,5 3,5 3,5 3,6 3,6
Kazakhstan 8,9 3,3 1,2 7,3 7,5 5 6 4,3 1,2 1,1 3,3 2,8 2,8 3,2 4,1 4,3
Turkmenistan 11,1 14,7 6,1 9,2 14,7 11,1 10,2 10,3 6,5 6,2 6,5 6,3 5,1 5 5,3 5,4
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ANALYSIS
Russia’s Foreign Policy—Current Trajectory and Future Prospects
Aglaya Snetkov, Center for Security Studies, ETH Zürich
Abstract
A central theme in debates about Russia’s foreign and security policy in 2017 has been the role it has played 
within ongoing international crises, with analysts seeking to discern whether Russia’s foreign policy is pre-
dominantly a product of ad hoc pragmatism and opportunism or a more systematic and long-term anti-
Western perspective. As argued in the article the answer is that it is a mixture of both. The Putin regime is 
on the one hand seeking to continue playing a pivotal role in individual security crises whilst on the other 
hand endeavouring to sustain its international position and further broader global alliances, often from a 
position of weakness.
Introduction
A central theme in debates about Russia’s foreign and 
security policy in 2017 has been the role it has played 
within ongoing international crises, notably Syria, 
North Korea and Ukraine. This has been accompanied 
by continued focus on Russian interference in the 2016 
US election. In both contexts, analysts have often been 
concerned with adjudicating whether or not Russia is 
a victor or a loser. Against this background, an impor-
tant question has become assessing the extent to which 
Russia’s foreign policy is a product of ad hoc pragma-
tism and opportunism or a more systematic and long-
term anti-Western perspective. The answer suggested by 
this article, it that it is a mixture of both. In spite of the 
prevalence of concerns about the relative decline of the 
West and its global influence, Russia—unlike China—
does not have the capabilities to set itself up as an effec-
tive counter-weight to the US. Instead, echoing Lukya-
nov, this article suggests that Russia is now focused on 
creating ‘fuzzy alliances and flexible relations’, in which 
it can continue to play a pivotal role within individual 
issues or crises. However, this selectivity does not rep-
resent a substantial long-term challenge to the influence 
of major powers, such as the US or China. This article 
will survey Russia’s foreign policy across the increas-
ingly diverse relations that the Putin regime is seek-
ing to establish.
Russia’s Relations with the West
The context in which Russia has been most frequently 
mentioned this year has been the ongoing fallout from 
the unexpected election of Donald Trump to the US 
presidency in 2016, and Russia’s purported role in this 
coming to pass. Whilst the Putin regime may have 
hoped for a renewal in its relations with Washington 
with Trump in the White House, 2017 has turned into 
one of the most problematic years in the US–Russia 
relationship since the end of the Cold War.
Whilst some in the Trump administration, such as 
Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, have continued to argue 
that it is the Ukraine factor that is ultimately preventing 
a normalization of relations between the two sides. In 
practice, it is virtually impossible to envisage a signifi-
cant change in relations now that “the Russia factor” has 
become so central to US domestic political debate about 
the nature of the Trump administration and the extent 
to which it was willing to collude with a foreign power 
to interfere in the American domestic electoral proc-
ess. As a result, the Russia factor has become poisonous 
among the domestic political milieu in Washington DC. 
Indeed, regardless of what the Special Counsel Robert 
Mueller’s investigation into Russia’s meddling in the 
election uncovers, the scope for a rapprochement in the 
short term is extremely unlikely. Added to this, as Alex-
ander Gabuev suggests, there’s less and less knowledge 
and expertise in Moscow and Washington DC about 
one another. This is serving to consolidate the trend of 
painting one another in simple and antagonistic terms.
Until there is some resolution in the machinations 
about the election, the Trump administration has its 
hands tied when it comes to its policy towards Russia. 
Hence, 2017 has seen the passing of the Russian Sanc-
tions Review Act into law in August and the prospect 
of a new round of sanctions targeting Russian elites in 
early 2018, the tit-for-that clampdowns on embassies 
and expulsions of embassy staff, the US agreement to 
supply lethal weapons to Ukraine and the labelling of 
Russia alongside China as the main security threats to 
the US, over and above terrorism. All in all, the impact 
of Trump’s election to the Presidency thus far has been 
a further souring of relations, rather than a new start.
Beyond the domestic US context, the wider relation-
ship between Russia and West also remained at an all-
time low across 2017. Indeed, as Kortunov suggests, the 
Russian official position continues to characterize the 
current choice in world affairs as one between order 
and chaos, with the West representing chaos, and Rus-
sia representing the path towards ‘developmental plural-
ism’. In Europe, whilst the predicted wave of (Russian-
backed) populist parties sweeping to power across the 
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continent did not materialize, concerns remain regard-
ing the ongoing links between populist regimes in East-
ern and Central Europe and the Putin regime. Against 
this background, Russia continues to be seen through 
the lens of representing a geopolitical threat, with fears 
mounting about cyber security and information/hybrid 
warfare challenges emanating from Russia. While the 
Kremlin views the continued sanctions regime and the 
build-up of NATO capabilities and forward resilience 
in Eastern Europe as undermining any amelioration 
in relations.
Relations with the Middle East
Russia’s role in Syria also remained a prime focus of 2017. 
In spite of commentators’ suggestions at the start of its 
campaign in 2015 that Russia will inevitably become 
bogged down in a quagmire, akin to its disastrous cam-
paign in Afghanistan in the 1980s, this has not tran-
spired. From the perspective of the Putin regime, not 
only has it demonstrated Russia’s willingness to use 
force abroad. It has also demonstrated its ability to take 
advantage of the West’s reluctance to become directly 
involved in conflicts in recent years, to the end of suc-
cessfully propping up a regime of its choosing. Indeed, 
with the Assad regime now on a much surer footing, the 
Putin regime has hailed its operation on the ground as 
a success and announced, in November, a drawdown of 
its military campaign.
Although the intervention has shown Russia’s con-
tinued ability to play a significant role in a specific secu-
rity crisis, questions remain as to what lies ahead for the 
Assad regime. Moscow has sought to promote the Sochi 
and Astana meetings in parallel to the Geneva talks, 
in order to position itself as a key broker in any future 
peace settlement. However, these alternative formats 
have only served to highlight the difficulties that Russia 
has in presenting itself as a neutral arbiter, in light of its 
military intervention on the side of the Assad regime. It 
has, therefore, struggled to bring all the various parties 
active in the Syrian crisis to the negotiating table, par-
ticularly opposition and rebel groups. Indeed, as Trenin 
notes, winning the peace in Syria is turning out to be 
much more problematic than winning the war for Russia.
In addition, Russia does not have the capacity to sin-
gle-handedly fund a reconstruction and rebuilding plan 
for Syria, and is thus reliant on Western and regional 
actors coming on board. This means that in order to cap-
italize on the short term successes of its military inter-
vention, Russia remains beholden to others in order to 
establish a stable post-conflict situation. Thus, although 
having acted militarily to have a big impact on the course 
of the conflict, Russia is both unwilling and unable to 
become the predominant power in the wider Middle 
East, preferring instead to share the burden for ensur-
ing stability and orders with others.
Alongside its apparent successes in Syria, Russia’s pol-
icy towards the wider Middle East also garnered signifi-
cant attention in 2017. Whilst it seeks advantage out of 
the West’s ongoing reluctance to become more actively 
engaged in the region, Russia, as Kozhanov notes, has 
adopted a pragmatic and transactional Middle Eastern 
policy. In this way, it has sought to balance a very diverse 
and seemingly incompatible set of relations with actors, 
including Iran, Turkey, Israel and Saudi Arabia. Ulti-
mately, this approach is a product of the Putin regime’s 
recognition that Russia has neither the long-term inter-
ests, nor the influence of the US in the region, or even 
that of the ever growing economic power of China. In 
this context, Russia follows a policy aimed at drawing 
short-term benefits through a pragmatic juggling act, but 
without a concerted, long-term and strategic dimension. 
Russia is, therefore, unlikely to become a fully engaged 
power in the Middle East, irrespective of its occasional 
interventions in individual crises and policy issues.
Russia’s Asia Pivot
During 2017, Russia sought to ensure that it does not 
become completely marginalized from another major 
security crisis, namely North Korea. Unlike in Syria, 
Russia is clearly a  second-order player, as compared 
with the US, China, South Korea or Japan. Nonethe-
less, Moscow has tried to position itself as a moderat-
ing and pacifying influence, at the same time as most 
closely aligning its position with China. For example, at 
a news conference after the September BRICS Summit 
in Xiamen and in the wake of North Korea’s sixth mis-
sile test, Putin adopted a moderating tone noting that 
“ramping up military hysteria in such conditions is sense-
less; it’s a dead end […]”. Before posing and answering 
a question: “What can restore their security? The resto-
ration of international law.”
Similarly in response to the North Korean mis-
sile test on 14th of September, Russian Foreign Min-
ister Sergei Lavrov described their leaders as “hotheads”, 
who needed to “calm down”. Lavrov also outlined that: 
“together with China we’ll continue to strive for a rea-
sonable approach and not an emotional one like when 
children in a kindergarten start fighting and no-one can 
stop them”. This alignment with China, for example by 
issuing joint statements on North Korea’s nuclear test-
ing, is intended to bolster Russia’s position within the 
political negotiation on the crisis.
Russia’s attempts to further diversify its relations and 
reduce its overreliance on the West continued apace in 
2017, with much of the focus on what Lukonin calls its 
‘Eastern policy’. In the main, this has centered on bol-
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stering bilateral relations with China. In political, eco-
nomic and military terms, both Moscow and Beijing 
have sought to emphasize their ongoing good relations. 
Xi was treated to a state visit to Russia in July, in which 
he emphasized that China and Russia are “good neigh-
bors, good friends, and good partners”. In addition, the 
two sides signed a joint plan in June for military coop-
eration in 2017–2020, and conducted joint Naval Exer-
cises in the Baltic sea in July and in the sea of Japan in 
September, together with military exercises in December. 
Russia is also set to deliver S-400 surface-to-air missile 
defense systems to China in 2018.
Undoubtedly, Russia is increasingly the junior part-
ner in the relationship, particularly when it comes to 
trade and economics. Yet, for now at least, the Russian 
leadership seems to accept this state of affairs. None-
theless, analysts continue to raise concerns about the 
increasing asymmetry, divergence and sustainability 
of this alliance in the long-term. As Niklas Swanström 
suggests, even if current relations are stable in the short-
term, longer-term prospects are ‘for storms’, notably 
with regard to the growing sinicization of Central Asia. 
Crucially, it also remains to be seen how far the dia-
logue about coordinating the Russian-led Eurasian Eco-
nomic Union and the China’s Belt & Road Initiative 
will lead to an understanding that is satisfactory to all 
parties concerned.
More broadly, Russia’s wider Eastern policy bore 
mixed results in 2017, with short-term gains mask-
ing potential longer-term problems. Whilst on the 
one hand the expansion of the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization to include Pakistan and India marked 
a new departure for the organization, this expansion 
has left the focus, priorities and relevance of this now 
pan-Asian multilateral framework much less clear. 
Similarly, there was ongoing cooperation between 
Russia and India on defense and joint military exer-
cises, but analysts have noted an ever more compet-
itive dynamic within the relationship. This has been 
fueled by the increasing economic disparity between 
the two powers. Uncertainty also characterizes Rus-
sia’s relationship with Japan, due to ongoing intransi-
gence over the Kuril islands. Although Japan adopted 
a ‘new approach’ to the dispute, until now it has not 
borne any fruit, except for bilateral meetings on the 
sidelines of G20 and Prime Minister Abe’s visit to Rus-
sia in September. The talks of a potential rapproche-
ment between the two sides have been complicated 
by Russia’s decision to designate the islands as a prior-
ity development zone, undermining any prospects of 
joint cooperation on this issue or Japanese firms being 
allowed to operate on the islands. In addition, Rus-
sia has also continued to raise its concerns about the 
deployment of American missile-defense systems in 
South Korea and Japan.
Overall, Russia’s Eastern policy continues to be 
a very mixed bag of short term gains, but with contin-
ued question marks hanging over the future direction 
of key relationships. This is of significance not only for 
these respective relationships, but it is also potentially 
problematic for the associated goal of diversifying Rus-
sian foreign policy away from a fractious relationship 
with the West and towards Asia.
Regional Dynamics
2017 saw no breakthroughs in the Ukraine crisis. The 
relationship between Moscow and Kiev remain in a per-
ilous state. The Minsk process remains stalled and mili-
tary confrontation in Eastern Donbass continues, amid 
repeated breakdowns in ceasefire talks. While the wider 
political negotiations have not progressed. The Ukraine 
crisis remains a major source of tension between Russia 
and its Western counterparts. This could be seen in the 
EU’s decision to continue its sanctions regime against 
Russia and the passing of an agreement in the US to 
provide Ukraine with lethal weapons.
Although the idea of placing UN peacekeepers along 
the conflict lines was floated in September and a major 
prisoner exchange took place in December, nothing 
has changed in practice. There is little sense the Krem-
lin has a strategy to extricate itself from the now intrac-
table crisis, particularly now that Ukraine has passed 
a  reintegration bill that labels Russia as an aggressor 
state. Despite denouncing the bill as undermining the 
Minsk II accord, the stalemate is becoming a liability for 
Russia. Indeed, the Ukraine crisis suggests that whilst 
the Putin regime may be adept at tactical and short term 
pragmatic victories, it often lacks suitable strategic solu-
tions for crisis resolution in the long-term. Although 
time will tell if it is successful, Moscow does seem to 
have a strategy to extricate Russia from the Syrian con-
flict. However, in Ukraine, the Putin regime seems to 
have no such strategy, exposing its lack of longer-term 
strategic thinking.
Undoubtedly, Ukraine remains the key issue for Rus-
sian policy in the post-Soviet space. Among the other 
priorities, Trenin has noted that most focus is currently 
on Belarus and Kazakhstan, Moscow’s closest regional 
partners. The ZAPAD 2017 military exercises in Sep-
tember were indicative of this focus. The Putin regime 
continued to emphasize the development of the Eurasian 
Economic Union, and continued to discuss the future 
prospects of creating a common energy market, a sin-
gle Eurasian sky program, and ongoing talks regarding 
the signing of free trade agreements with actors such as 
ASEAN and Egypt, India, Iran, Israel, Singapore, and 
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Serbia and the potential of an economic-trade agree-
ment with China. However, with little change in Rus-
sian economy’s performance, the decline in the momen-
tum of the project continued in 2017.
Conclusion
In summarizing all of the above, Russia’s foreign policy 
during 2017 can be characterized by a focus on acquiring 
short-term gains from its role in ongoing international 
crises, whilst remaining open to new opportunities for 
increasing its influence in regions further afield. Russia 
has continued to work to increase its relevance across 
a divergent set of relations regions (Europe, Middle East, 
East Asia, South Asia), at the same time as seeking to 
turn individual security crises to its advantage. None-
theless, despite its symbolic image as a major threat to 
the West, Russia remains a  second tier player on the 
world stage. In recognition of this, the Putin regime 
adopts a pragmatic and flexible approach. Indeed, when 
it comes to crisis-politics, Russia can still play a major 
role on the world stage and impact on how these crises 
unfold. However, the extent to which Russia will be 
able to implement a robust and concerted policy across 
such a diverse set of relationships over the long-term 
remains unclear.
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